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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines de facto property rights. It accepts that the current Legal 
position provides inadequate remedy for those who are attempting to establish rights 
to property on the termination of a de facto relationship, and considers arguments 
for and against state regulation as a means of rectifying these inadequacies. In 
doing so it outlines the aims of such reform. 
The paper then considers issues in need of examination before any process of 
Legislative reform is undertaken. International and domestic human rights issues are 
examined to ensure that any Legislative proposal conforms with these requirements 
and promotes human rights. De facto relationships are compared with marriage in 
order to consider the use of some existing matrimonial property provisions for de 
facto couples. The question of how to define a de facto relationship is also 
considered. 
Part IV of the paper provides the background to the approach adopted in Part V 
which is to set out in detail (in the form of a draft Bill) a proposal for Legislative 
reform. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents pages, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 17,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Property sharing has been described as "one of the most important issues at the end 
of a de facto relationship" .1 It is important not only for its financial implications but 
also for the fact that its resolution must come at a time when relationships are under 
strain. The increasing incidence of de facto relationships2 will predictably be met 
with a corresponding rise in the breakdown of such relationships; a situation for 
which the law is presently ill-equipped to deal with. 
As this paper will outline, the current lack of any statutory provision for property 
sharing in these situations creates inequities, both between the parties to the 
relationship themselves, and when outcomes are compared against those attained by 
couples whose marriages have broken down. The paper attempts to provide a 
remedy for this situation. 
The phrase "de facto relationship" used throughout this paper has been chosen to 
describe the relationships referred to.3 Although lacking in legal precision it is a 
phrase to which common usage has ascribed a definition that is generally understood 
and accepted and it has therefore been selected in preference to alternative choices. 
The term de facto relationship is commonly used to refer to heterosexual couple 
2 
3 
W R Atkin Living Together Without Marriage (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1991) 73. 
New Zealand census figures are: 1981 87,960 people; 1986 114,279 people, 
1991 161,856 people. It is important to note that this is a self-defining status. 
"The phrase "de facto relationship" ... implies that there is a relationship 
existing as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of law. Thus "marriage" 
is a de jure relationship, existing by operation of law independently of how 
the parties in fact Ii ve." Above n 1, 4. 
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who cohabit without marrying each other, and it 1s these couples to whom the 
primary focus of this paper is directed.4 
Both the language and the legal changes suggested need to be viewed in their wider, 
social context. New Zealand society and its legal system are grappling with a 
changing notion of what it means to be a family. The trend has been increasingly 
inclusive, and "family" now embraces groups that were once con idered to be outside 
of its ambit.5 
Another important contextual change is the ascendancy of the rights of children and 
the corresponding responsibilities of parents, and also of society as a whole, to 
protect and nurture young people. Strongly allied with this is the belief that the 
family is the optimal place to do this and that therefore it is a unit that should be 
supported, and supported in its various forms. 6 
It is in this context that the paper considers the position of de facto relationship 
property rights in the hope that detailed examination provides justification for the 
need to pass an Act of Parliament to rectify the current situation. The paper 
concludes with a draft Bill to give an indication of the form that such legislation 
might take. 
4 
5 
6 
Arguments are made in this paper for the inclusion of same sex de facto 
relationships in any legislative scheme. Argument are also made for limiting 
statutory cover to sexual or "marriage-like" relation hips, although it is 
acknowledged that a wider coverage could be given, as under the Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT). 
For example, Pacific Island and Maori extended families, childless couples, 
de facto couples and one parent families . 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1 O; 
below, Part III A 1 (a). It may be considered that some practical moves such 
as cuts to domestic purposes benefits run counter to the articulation of this 
theory. 
- 2 -
II WHY REGULATE? 
A THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION 
1 The Historical Position 
An examination of the historical position gives a vital perspective on the "state 
institution" of marriage as a relatively recent phenomenon. In some ways the 
relationship between marriage and other forms of cohabitation has come full circle. 
The last two decades have seen a narrowing of the factors that distinguish one from 
the other. Legally, socially and morally the demarcation lines between the two are 
now less distinct, evidenced for example, by the abandonment of the status of 
illegitimacy ,7 community practices of openness8 and by the fact that such terms as 
"living in sin" have all but fallen into disuse. Many de facto relationships are 
functionally indistinguishable from marriage.9 The sole difference may be that a 
formal registration of the relationship has not taken place. Both kinds of 
relationships encompass an extensive range of affiliation. 
This was also the position prior to Lord Hardwicke's Act for the Better Prevention 
of Clandestine Marriages 1753 (UK), 10 which marked the beginning of a formal role 
for the state in what was to become the "institution" of marriage. Before 1753 
marriage involved an agreement between the parties to it that could have, but did not 
7 
8 
9 
Status of Children Act 1969, s 3. 
For example, practices of schools towards unmarried, cohabiting parents and 
practices of landlords towards pro pective unmarried tenants. 
This functional indistinguishability has meant that arguments promoting 
marriage as superior to, and different from de facto relationships have become 
increasingly difficult to sustain. 
10 26 Geo. II c.33. 
- 3 -
require, witnesses or religious recognition. 11 Cohabitation was a way of proving 
such "marriages by consent", 12 and relationships took on many forms, not all of 
which were permanent. Church involvement began in the thirteenth century and 
introduced the concept of marriage as a monogamous union for life. Religious 
ceremony marking the event of marriage was initially an upper-class privilege, 13 
popular because of its ability to protect proprietary interests due to its legitimating 
effect on the blood line. A trade in illegal marriage by enterprising clergy 
developed. 14 The courts at the time called repeatedly for state intervention to 
remedy property rights issues, as they are doing now. 15 The 1753 Act was passed 
in response to these calls and it allowed for only one mode of legal marriage which 
included a formal, public ceremony incorporating religious elements grounded in 
moral beliefs. 
Therefore the line between formal marriage and other relationships became very 
clearly marked by Lord Hardwicke's Act. Marriage represented a neat convergence 
of state and church interests and its absence lead to both social and legal 
disadvantages. 16 The state adopted the ecclesiastical view of marriage as a 
11 E A Quin and C J O'Neill Cohabitation in New Zealand: Legal and Social 
Aspects (University of Waikato, Hamilton, 1984) 4; MD A Freeman and C 
M Lyon Cohabitation Without Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy 
(Gower, Aldershot, 1983) 6. 
12 E A Quin & C J O'Neill, above n 11, 4, n 4. 
13 Above n 12, 4, n 5; M D A Freeman and C M Lyon refer to it as an 
"optional extra ... considered both expensive and otiose", above n 11, 6. 
14 M D A Freeman and C M Lyon, above n 11, 8. 
15 The difference being that historically these were succession issues based on 
questions of legitimacy of heirs, whereas today most property issues arise 
from the breakdown of relationships during the lifetime of the parties. For 
an example of a recent judicial call for a legislative response see Gillies v 
Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327, 347, per Richardson J. 
16 The starkest example being the status of children of informal unions: that of 
filius nullius or nobody's child. The law did not recognise such children, 
conferring neither rights nor protection on them. 
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monogamous, irrevocably life-long commitment 17 because this accorded with its 
interest in a tidy and sure system of ownership of property. 
Before 1857 18 divorce was only possible by an ecclesiastical decree or through a 
private Act of Parliament. Since then divorce has continued to become more freely 
available to the point where we now have a no-fault system. 19 The law is no longer 
interested in the reasons for the breakdown of a marriage but rather in sorting out the 
consequences of that fact. 20 
Today the law does not ignore relationships merely because they lack a marriage 
licence, but it has been a reluctant participant in sorting out the property 
consequences arising from the breakdown of de facto relationships. Legal 
intervention in de facto relationships is very evident in areas such as maintenance and 
custody issues.21 The increasing incidence of de facto relationships22 means that 
problems left unresolved by the law will continue to grow.23 
17 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. 
18 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (UK) introduced judicial divorce on the sole 
ground of adultery (once again the emphasis was on the protection of 
property rights); Quin & O'Neill note that only two or three divorces a year 
were granted by means of an Act of Parliament, above n 12, 10. 
19 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 39. Some argue that the legal responses to 
this changing concept of marriage have been a reactive measure aimed at 
saving the institution of marriage which would have simply been by-passed 
if it had remained inflexible and legally binding for life, Quin & O'Neill, 
above n 12, 11. 
20 The Matrimonial Property Act 197 6 and the Guardianship Act 1968 are 
examples of this approach. 
21 See for example, P Vaver "The Legal Effects of De Facto Relationships" 
[1976] NZ Recent Law 161; H Cull "De Facto Couples & Family Law -
What Protection?" Conference Paper, New Zealand Suffrage Centennial 
Women's Law Conference, Wellington, 1993, 255, 260. 
22 Above n 2. 
23 In many ways the issues are clouded by the re-emergence of the blurring of 
the distinction between de facto and de jure marriage. 
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2 The Current New Zealand Position 
As de facto relationships often perform familial functions, their interface with the law 
is primarily in the Family Courts. For example, the Family Proceedings Act 1980 
makes provision for counselling to be available to married couples as well as to 
couples in relationships in the nature of marriage.24 The Family Court does not 
have jurisdiction to hear property division disputes between couples whose 
relationships have broken down.25 Currently such disputes are heard in the High 
Court and by the Court of Appeal on appeal. There is no statutory codification of 
the applicable principles relating to property division for de facto couples as there is 
under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 for married and formerly married couples. 
De facto relationship property disputes fall to the general law to be resolved. Most 
often these are dealt with under common law although statutory provisions are not 
without relevance. 26 
The law of trusts is the area of law to which many counsel have turned. The four 
main types of trust: express, implied, constructive and resulting, have all been 
employed to ascertain whether a partner to a de facto relationship without legal title 
to property can be granted a beneficial interest in that property. Express trusts, 
where the parties have declared their respective beneficial interests in writing are Jess 
problematic and less likely to be challenged in court. The existence of an implied 
trust is determined by the court, and it is necessary for the court to find a common 
intention or agreement between the parties. As intention must be inferred or implied, 
evidential problems arise. Constructive trusts are "constructed" in the absence of 
common intention. Resulting trusts arise where a beneficial interest is retained even 
though an asset has been disposed of. 
24 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 8; s 7A(l)(b), includes these couples in the 
definition of marriage. 
25 This anomaly is further highlighted by the fact that the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, s 5( 1) ( as amended by Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Amendment Act 1991, s 3) conferred jurisdiction to 
hear testamentary promises claims upon the Family Court. 
26 Including Contractual Remedies Act 1979 and Domestic Actions Act 1975; 
WR Atkin "De Facto Engaging Our Attention" [1988] NZLJ 12. 
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The equitable action of proprietary estoppel has also been utilised. If an expectation 
of an interest in property is raised and relied upon and causes detriment to the person 
expecting the interest, then an action may be sustainable. 
Many of the principles of equity and common law that are applied to this area were 
not designed for the purpose to which they are now being put. While equitable 
remedies found in the law of trusts and restitution are malleable, they have proved 
inadequate for the task of reallocating property on the breakdown of a de facto 
relationship in the sense that even where an equitable interest is established it may 
be very small.27 The kind of remedy available under trust law is also limited, 
especially when compared to those available under the Matrimonial Property Act 
1976. Trust law further suffers from the limitation of applying on an asset by asset 
basis.28 This approach was a reason for criticism when applied by the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1963, and indeed was a motivating factor for the introduction of the 
1976 Act.29 
Trust law places a heavy probative burden on the claimant.
30 Evidence supporting 
the creation of a legal interest is required because property rights do not 
automatically spring from the relationship itself but only arise where they can be 
justified under the applicable equitable principles. 
27 This is further borne out by the results of cases; a perusal by the author of 28 
cases decided over the last ten years (three of which involved joint ownership 
and therefore were not considered on this point) revealed that a legal interest 
in the title to the real property of the relationship was awarded at an average 
rate of 21 % to the non property owning partner. The average length of the 
relationship was 7 .5 years. 
28 D Harvey "The Property Rights of De Facto Partners - Some Proposals for 
Reform" [1989] NZLJ 167, 168. 
29 Harvey discusses this point and notes the criticism levelled at E v E [ 1971] 
NZLR 859 and the subsequent treatment of the issue on appeal by the Privy 
Council in Haldane v Haldane [1976] 2 NZLR 715; above n 28, 174. See 
also J B Robertson "Matrimonial Property and Haldane's Ca e" [1977] NZLJ 
19. 
30 Above n 28, 169. 
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Application of the law in this fashion is cumbersome and leads to unpredictability 
as well as to uncertainty of outcome. While it is not the place of this paper to 
outline in detail the shortcomings of the common law, it is noted that these factors 
make property dispute resolution a legal minefield. The need to litigate greatly adds 
to the cost of such dispute resolution and in doing so diminishes the value of 
property common to the relationship. 
Added to this uncertainty are the myths that surround de facto property rights. 
Although of uncertain origin their popularity is such that the commonly held but 
incorrect view that a presumption of equal sharing exists after two years of 
cohabitation is virtually an urban myth. That this has lead to social, political and 
legal problems is evidenced by the fact that in June of this year the Legal Services 
Board launched a month long education programme to help dispel these myths.
31 
The advice generally given to de facto parties wishing to secure their rights in 
property is to ensure that their name is on the title to any real property and to enter 
into a cohabitation contract with the other partner.
32 However, it is no small step 
to move from a position of awareness of one's legal position to one of initiating 
action to alter that position. The creation of cohabitation contracts also presumes an 
ability for forethought on the part of the parties as well as a prior realisation that the 
parties' commitment to the relationship is a long term one. The prerequisites of 
articulation and financial outlay mean that such agreements are largely the preserve 
of the middle and upper classes. 
31 Confusion may have arisen from the fact that the Matrimonial Property Bill, 
when introduced into Parliament by the then Minister of Justice, included de 
facto relationships of two years standing or longer within the tatutory cover. 
The fact that de facto couples are treated as if they were married in so many 
areas of the law may add to the lingering confusion over the legal 
implications of property division at the end of a de facto relationship. 
J
2 Although called a contract this is most commonly entered into in the form of 
a deed which overcomes problems encountered in using contract law; above 
n 1, 152. 
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3 The Interests of the State 
An examination of the state's interest in the provision of a statute dealing with de 
facto property rights is by no means incidental to this inquiry. Historically both legal 
and functional marriages were considered to be in the realm of the private sphere of 
human activity and thus outside the area in which the state could legitimately 
intervene. Indeed the state's interest in marriage is relatively recent given a historical 
perspective. State intervention in the 1990s into what is traditionally known as the 
private sphere has reached unsurpassed heights. To take the example of family life 
generally, there are numerous statutes dealing with protection of children. the 
breakdown of the relationship between the partners, responsibilities relating to child 
support, schooling and housing.33 Therefore, the use of a non-interventionist 
approach and its corollary of legislative inaction in de facto property rights can no 
longer be justified. 
The state's interest in providing for property resolution of de facto relationships falls 
into several areas. The most persuasive of these from a political perspective are 
financial considerations. A partner who has spent a number of years in a de facto 
relationship caring for the children of that relationship may have both a decreased 
earning capacity and the future financial commitment of caring for children. If that 
person also has a limited or complete lack of equity in the property of that 
relationship he or she will be placed at a financial disadvantage. This in turn may 
result in financial dependence on the state. The state also requires that people living 
together as a family unit take financial responsibility for any children of that unit. 
Therefore, a domestic purposes benefit will be suspended once the recipient as umes 
cohabitation, thus lessening dependence on the state.
34 
33 For example, Family Protection Act 1980, Guardianship Act 1968, Domestic 
Protection Act 1982, Child Support Act 1991 and Children, Young Persons 
and Their Families Act 1989. 
34 Social Security Act 1964, s 27B (as amended by Social Security Amendment 
Act 1987 s 11 (2) and Social Security Amendment Act (No 2) 1991 , s 4( 1 )) . 
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The need to litigate also reallocates the financial resources of separating couples in 
a way that does not provide for their needs in that it removes this money from their 
possession. The state therefore has an interest in the avoidance of litigation. 
The state's financial interest extends to the provision of dispute resolution 
procedures. These should not place an onerous burden on either the parties to the 
dispute, or on state funds. A simple, cost effective system would meet these needs 
in a way that the present need to litigate in the High Court does not. 
The state also has an interest in stability. Marriages and marriage-like relationships 
are seen to promote this stability as long as they remain intact. Although property 
division issues only arise where a relationship has broken down, and therefore may 
appear to have little to do with stability, the current uncertainties and inequities 
exacerbate the settlement process and do not promote the goal of speedy resolution. 
It may even be argued that the rapid and simple resolution of property disputes 
assists the parties to enter into new relationships and that if property issues from 
prior relationships are settled this will enhance the chances of any subsequent 
relationship becoming a long term one. 
The Family Proceedings Act 1980 promotes the clean break principle with regard to 
inter-spousal maintenance.35 The concept is that it is in the best interests of all 
parties concerned to resolve with finality any remaining property issues between 
them, and that spouses do not have a continuing obligation to support each other. 
36 
The current state of the law means that property issues between de facto partners 
often remain unresolved, or are resolved at length either through protracted litigation 
or inter-party negotiation of uncertain result. 37 A statutory provision that promoted 
35 Section 64(2). 
36 This approach has been adopted in Australian statutes dealing with de facto 
property rights; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 14; De Facto 
Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), s 19. 
37 These methods mean that a party with greater power within the relationship, 
or with a disproportionately greater access to funds, can influence the 
outcome of the dispute. 
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the concept of the clean break principle would extend what is seen as desirable in 
dissolved marriages to a wider group.38 
Although there may be some opposition to the complete equation of de facto 
relationships with marriages,39 a closer alliance in terms of the outcomes of property 
disputes would be desirable. The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 has gone some way 
to improving the regime that preceded it, and these benefits could be extended to de 
facto partners. 
4 Legislative Reform 
(a) Reasons For and Against 
Inequities of process and of result have given rise to numerous calls for a legislative 
response to remedy the situation.40 In 1994 these calls were taken up by Judith 
Tizard MP, Labour Associate Justice Spokesperson, who proposed the introduction 
of a private members Bill dealing with de facto property rights, considering 
contributions to the relationship including non-financial contributions, succession 
issues after the death of a de facto partner and also protection for gay and lesbian 
couples.41 
38 V Ullrich "Matrimonial Property - Is There Equality Under the Matrimonial 
Property Act?" Conference Paper, The Family Court Ten Years On, 
Auckland, 1991) 97 criticises the application of the clean break principle in 
relationships where children are involved. 
39 Above n 28, 169; above n 26, 12. 
40 Among them are: Report of the Working Party on Matrimonial Property and 
Family Protection (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988) 85; above n 1, 
189; above n 28, 167; above n 21, 261. The position expressed in this paper 
is that such calls should be heeded. Although outside the scope of the paper, 
it is acknowledged that other areas of law pertaining to de facto relationships 
are in need of reform, for example succession issues. 
41 "No protection for de facto couples - MP "Otago Daily Times, Dunedin, New 
Zealand, 30 May 1994, 24; "Bill on de facto marriage rights" Bay of Plenty 
Times, Tauranga, New Zealand, 30 April 1994, 3. 
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Support for such a move is not universal. Arguments against recognising de facto 
property rights in this form fall into two schools of thought. Libertarians promote 
individual autonomy and argue that the provision of a scheme similar to that given 
for those leaving marriages restricts the freedom of choice for de facto partners to 
consciously choose not to enter into this kind of arrangement. This argument 
presupposes that a conscious choice not to marry is made and also that the result of 
the legislative imposition will be the same as, or similar to, marriage. It also 
assumes that the parties have chosen to live together outside of marriage in order to 
avoid the incidents of marriage. 
Arguments of autonomy can only be taken so far; when taken to their logical extreme 
they promote individualism to the point of undermining a sense of cornmunity.42 
Individualism is also a Pakeha or Western concept and therefore it may be 
ethnocentric to promote it as a goal in a bicultural society. Autonomy presumes that 
individuals have equal amounts of power, and appears to conflict with the perceived 
need to protect the weaker partner of the relationship. There must also be 
consideration of the fact that both within marriage and within de facto relationships 
there is a considerable degree of difference, individuality and ability to create the 
relationship to suit the people in it.43 Further, in many ways both autonomy and 
freedom of choice have been encroached upon by the previously mentioned move of 
the law into the so-called private sphere.44 
The second major group opposing legislative moves in this area consists of those 
who are opposed to relationships that are in the nature of marriage but are without 
legal or religious sanction. Opposition here comes from a moral standpoint. Shift 
in moral opinion are difficult to establish quantitatively, but the rise in numbers of 
unmarried cohabitees has been hailed as an indicator that there has been an attitudinal 
42 Above n l, 195. 
43 The law permits parties to a marriage to formalise difference from the norm 
by provisions such as Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 21. The same kind 
of freedom could be extended to legally regulated de facto relationships. 
44 Above Part II A 3. 
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shift towards such relationships.45 It is submitted that a statute that makes provision 
for property division on the breakdown of a relationship is concerned with that 
breakdown rather than with the reasons, whether perceived as moral or immoral, for 
entering into that relationship. In other words, it concentrates on the practical effects 
of the dissolution of the relationship rather than questioning the reason for that 
breakdown or the reasons why marriage has not been entered into. The state may 
be concerned with preventing breakdown, but, it is submitted, it also needs to be 
concerned with providing for those relationships where breakdown is not preventable, 
or, at the very least, where it is an unassailable fact. There is also some debate over 
the extent to which moral values should be reflected in the law, and over how the 
law should accommodate conflicting values.46 The moral viewpoint also needs to 
take into account the fact that a number of people enter into de facto relationships 
because they are unable to marry. This includes those who are still married to a 
previous partner. Therefore it is the very inability to obtain legal sanction for the 
relationship that gives rise to some de facto living arrangements. 
(b) Aims of Legislative Reform 
The primary aim of legislative reform in this area would be a remedial one. It would 
seek to redress the difficulties of non property owning partners establishing any rights 
to property once a relationship has broken down.47 It would aim to produce a fair 
outcome. This remedy is necessary not only because of the legislative lacuna but 
also because in the absence of statutory direction, the common law has failed to 
satisfactorily resolve the situation.48 The aim of legislative reform would therefore 
45 Above n 1, 2. 
46 See, for example, H I Hart Law, Liberty, and Morality (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1963); P Devlin The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1965). 
47 Some current difficulties exist for partners who have legal title, but who seek 
an increased share. Trust law has the ability to alter the interests of legal title 
holders as well as to create legal interests. 
48 The extent of the mischief is evident from the outcomes of the trust law cases 
in this area; above n 27. 
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be to alleviate the deficiencies found in the common law. Legislation would do this 
in two main ways. First, by providing the kind of clarity that would remove the need 
to litigate in the majority of cases, and then by providing a procedure in those cases 
where litigation was still necessary. Secondly, it would aim to promote fairness in 
outcome however that may be defined. It would also create remedies that would go 
beyond what is currently available. This lack of remedy, which is a major deficiency 
of the common law, could be addressed in a number of ways, primarily through the 
use of court orders vesting property or adjusting the parties' entitlement to it. 
One of the currently perceived areas of unfairness is the way that the law operates 
to the detriment of women.49 More often than not it is the woman's name that is 
missing from the title to the home of the family 50 and therefore it is the female 
partner to the relationship who is most often forced into pursuing her property rights 
by initiating court action. 51 Women rate disproportionately highly as custodial 
parents52 and this places added financial burdens on them. This is especially so in 
a post-relationship sense where children need to be housed. A lack of access to 
property or its financial equivalent means that some women are forced to remain in 
relationships that are less than satisfactory. Where women are caregivers, their 
contributions to the relationship are primarily of a non-financial nature and are not 
as easy to quantify as financial contributions. With regard to de facto relationships 
49 Support for this position is not uniform. Mr Gazley, lawyer for the appellant 
in Lankow v Rose (CA 176/93, judgment reserved) " ... said it was a self-
serving feminist assumption that at the end of a de facto relationship there 
should be a division of home and chattels between former partners"; "De 
facto should not have got half shares - counsel" The Dominion, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 14 September 1994, 7. 
so Of 28 cases studied by the author, women had their name on the title in ten 
instances (37%). It is acknowledged that a number of cases involve women 
who come to the de facto relationship with a prior matrimonial property 
settlement. 
5 1 Of 28 cases decided since 1984, 19, or 68% were initiated by the female 
partner to the relationship. 
52 In 1990 74% of children who were the subject of custody orders under the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980 had those orders made giving sole custody to 
their mothers; All About Women in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 1993), 41. 
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there is currently a lack of any statutory or common law presumption of equal 
weighting of financial and non-financial contributions.53 
Many of the issues that impact upon women also impact upon their children. 
Promoting the best interests of children, which a growing body of family law is 
attempting to do, means that there is a need to further the interests of the carers of 
children. 
The provision of certainty in the law would be a further aim of legislation. In order 
to achieve this aim the statute would need to provide a set of guidelines which, 
although remaining flexible, would give a clear indication of the direction to be 
followed.54 It would also need to be accompanied by an extensive amount of 
publicity along the lines of that given to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 during 
its introductory period.55 A major spin off of this provision of certainty would be 
the removal of the need to litigate in many cases. Parties would have little interest 
in challenging a property settlement if it was in accordance with the provisions of the 
statute. If it was clear that equality between partners was the aim of the law then 
matters would be settled with this in mind. 
S Conclusions 
The need for legislative intervention is based upon existing inadequacies in the law. 
Arguments for the continued exclusion of de facto couples from access to property 
rights legislation have been shown to be of less force than arguments that 
demonstrate the need to support "functional families". These arguments are further 
explored in Part III of the paper, which examines de facto relationships in the light 
53 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 18(2) creates such a presumption for 
marriage partnerships. 
54 It is arguable that although this is the intended approach of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976, that Act still vests a large amount of discretion with the 
judiciary. 
55 A H Angelo and W R Atkin "The Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 - Some 
Further Thoughts" [1976] NZLJ 424. 
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of discriminatory issues as well as looking at comparisons made with marriage and 
at the issue of how to define a de facto relationship. 
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III LEGISLATION: PRELIMINARY 
ISSUES 
A ISSUES OF DISCRIMINATION 
Any discussion of a legislative proposal regarding property rights for parties to de 
facto relationships that have broken down must necessarily include an examination 
of the proposal in the light of New Zealand's international obligations and domestic 
statutory provisions. This is to ensure that the proposal does not conflict with 
international or national requirements.56 It is also useful to consider such legislation 
from the perspective of how it might advance human rights. 
There are several ways in which these considerations may have an impact. Concepts 
of marriage, marital status and heterosexism are discussed in the light of international 
and domestic law, and consideration is given to both the use of international 
instruments to argue for the introduction of de facto property rights legislation as a 
way of fulfilling New Zealand's international obligations, and to whether the 
introduction of such legislation would contravene any of these obligations. 
56 These aspects will be checked during the parliamentary process; "Ministers 
intending to propose legislation must submit papers to the Cabinet Legislation 
Committee, first, when seeking approval for the inclusions of the Bill into the 
legislative programme and, second, when seeking approval to the introduction 
of the Bill to Parliament. Ministers will also have obtained approval of the 
policy underlying the proposed legislative change from the appropriate 
Cabinet Committee and Cabinet before approval is sought through the Cabinet 
Legislation Committee for a Bill to be introduced ... [e]ach paper must, among 
other things ... confirm that the Bill complies with the Treaty of Waitangi and 
the Bill of Rights Act and international legali ation and standards"; 
Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content (Legislation Advisory 
Committee, Report No. 6, Revised Edition, Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1991) 3. Private members Bills are not ubject to this proces , 
but once introduced into Parliament the Legislation Advisory Committee can 
make submissions either at the request of a Cabinet Committee or at its own 
initiative. 
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1 International Conventions 
International in truments pertinent to this enquiry are located in five different 
documents. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the document from which 
all of the others stem. The drafting of the Declaration was one of the first tasks of 
the fledgling United Nations. It sets out universal rights and is a "common standard 
of achievement" as opposed to a "legally binding set of rules" .57
 These ideals were 
later transformed into more concrete treaty provisions capable of imposing legal 
obligations. This process saw the ratification by the United Nations of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which were adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1966 but not ratified by the United Nations until 1976.58 New Zealand 
ratified these two covenants in December 1978.59 
All three of these United Nations documents prohibit discrimination on the grounds 
of 6() 
"race, colour, sex, language, religion , political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status." 
57 United Nations International Instruments on Human Rights (Human Rights 
Commission, Wellington, 1989) 3. 
58 At the time ratification required the approval of 35 member states. 
59 The covenants were ratified subject to some reservations. They pertain to, 
inter alia, juvenile incarceration, the pre-existence of the Race Relations Act 
1971 as justification for refraining from the introduction of further legislation, 
exceptions for trade unions, and the right to delay the introduction of paid 
maternity leave until economic circumstances improve; above n 57, 3. 
6() Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(1); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Article 2(2). 
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The position codified by the Status of Children Act 1969 is reaffirmed by these 
provisions, as it constitutes a breach of the covenants to distinguish between children 
born in or out of wedlock.61 
(a) The Right to Marry and to Found a Family 
Although the prohibited grounds of discrimination may have formed a person's 
beliefs about marriage, for example a religious or political belief, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does not include marriage or marital status as a 
specifically prohibited ground of discrimination.62 It does, however, state that 
everyone has the right to marry and to found a family. 63 
Establishing a right to marry necessitates a working definition of marriage. Globally 
the term involves vastly differing unions with marked differences in the religious and 
social bases for them.64 Although family is a culture-specific term, the United 
Nations appears to use the modern Western meaning of the word which focuses 
primarily on the nuclear family. 65 Although the United Nations documents are 
drafted in broad and all-encompassing language, and should be read inclusively 
wherever possible, it is still obvious that they have a first world orientation. For 
61 This is stated with more precision in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 25, "All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection." 
62 Arguably marital status falls within "or other status" ; see also the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1 O; 
below, in this section of the paper, (Part III A l (a)). 
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16. 
64 M J Eriksson The Right to Marry and to Found a Family (Ivstus Forlag, 
Uppsala, 1990) 25. 
65 This type of approach has been labelled "cultural chauvinism"; F Olsen 
"Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child" in P Alston, S Parker and J Seymour 
(eds) Children, Rights and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 216. 
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example, repeated references to spouse and not spouses appears to indicate an 
assumption of monogamous marriage. 
In New Zealand, relationships in the nature of marriage attract legal and financial 
responsibilities that in many instances are similar to, or the same as, those that exist 
for married people.66 However these relationships are clearly not marriages. A 
statute that provided for the settlement of de facto property rights disputes would not 
interfere with the right to marry found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
assuming that the option to marry was one that was still available. The statute would 
provide remedies for de facto relationships at their termination, thus providing new 
rights, rather than using de facto relationships to limit marital rights or the option of 
marriage. 
There is a divergence of opinion over whether the right to found a family extends 
beyond the right to marry. In the debates that led to the signing of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 it appears that the assumption was made that 
only those who were married had the right to found a family. 67 The United Nations 
debates did not include a discussion of whether there were any procreative rights that 
might possibly extend beyond those found within marriage. But if family includes 
unions other than marriages68 then the right is circumscribed only by the need for 
the spouses to be of full age.69 
It seems at least arguable that the right to found a family exists independently of the 
right to marry, if not at the time the Declaration was drafted then at least in the light 
66 For example personal tax rates and rebates for child care payments; child 
support provisions. 
67 Above n 64, 131. 
68 Some argue for this interpretation; above n 64, 131. 
69 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16; in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights this is described as marriageable age. 
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of social trends since the 1940s, and also considering the position of children under 
New Zealand law.70 
The enactment of legislation specific to de facto couples in "functional marriages" 
would bolster this right. Its extension to de facto relationships on an "economic unit" 
basis would not infringe the right in any way either. It is difficult to see how an Act 
dealing with the resolution of property entitlement at the end of a de facto 
relationship can interfere with right to found a family, unless by inadequately 
providing for the future of a party to that relationship, it prevents that person from 
later having children. 71 
However the international documents go further than protecting marriage. They 
uphold the right of the family, referred to as the "natural and fundamental group" of 
society "to the widest possible protection" particularly "while it is responsible for the 
care and education of dependent children" .72 The definition of family includes all 
de facto partnerships where children are cared for, whether or not those children are 
the issue of the de facto union.73 This, therefore, bolsters the argument for a wider 
interpretation of marriage and illustrates that denying de facto partnerships similar 
opportunities to those found in post-marital property rights is discriminatory. 
70 Although presumptions as to paternity differ, the law relating to children does 
not generally directly distinguish between children born in or out of wedlock; 
above n 7. 
71 This in turn raises the question of whether financial hardship can circumscribe 
the right to found a family. If so, then prohibitively high costs for access to 
a sisted reproductive technology may encroach upon the right. 
72 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article l 0. 
73 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 
10( 1). 
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(b) The Rights of Children 
Universal entitlement regardless of birth is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.74 A United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child was 
adopted by the General Assembly in November 1959, adopted as the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 and ratified by New Zealand in 1993. 
Children are central to the United Nations' concept of family, and the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child promotes the rights and the place of the child 
within this unit. In doing so it also recognises that the family unit must be supported 
in order to be able to fulfil its child rearing role. 
Again it is arguable that the rights of children would be better protected regardless 
of the marital status of their parents if de facto property rights legislation of the kind 
proposed in Part V of this paper was enacted. A child-centred approach places the 
rights of children ahead of the marital status of their parents. The Family Court 
system introduced in New Zealand in 1980 adopts this approach.75 The 
circumvention of litigation by parents is in the interests of their children, especially 
if it keeps the common property somewhere within the family unit as opposed to 
moving it to the pockets of their respective counsel. If litigation is not pursued then 
a more equitable distribution in favour of the non property owning parent will benefit 
any children who live with that parent. Therefore the rights of children could be 
enhanced by such legislation.76 
74 Article 2. 
75 Access to the Family Court i not limited to married couples; Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, s 7 A(l )(b) includes in the definition of marriage "a 
relationship in which the parties are or have been living together as husband 
and wife, although not legally married to each other". This in turn allows 
access to services such as counselling and custody dispute resolution 
procedures to all "marriage-like" relationships, including those with children. 
76 There is evidence to suggest that post-divorce poverty has an adverse effect 
on custodial parents and the children who live with them; J M and C J 
Krauskopf "Comparable Sharing in Practice: A Pilot Study of Results under 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976" (1988) 18 VUWLR 21, 34. 
- 22 -
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in Article 23(4) that 
"States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality 
of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. In the case of dis olution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children." 
Children of dissolved77 marriages are therefore to be given necessary protection. 
This conceivably includes protection of the long term financial status of the new 
family unit, including situations where this new unit involves a de facto relationship. 
Arguably, the reference in Article 23(4) relates solely to marriage, because of its 
clear use of wording that only applies to marriage.78 
The current legislative situation means that children residing with a non property 
owning parent who is not married to their other parent are financially disadvantaged 
when compared to their peers who live with a divorced parent. Protection of these 
children is inadequate if the custodial parent has no rights to the property of the 
relationship. Establishing these rights is far more difficult for those parents than for 
their divorced counterparts, who may be able to rely on the presumption of equal 
sharing of the family home.79 This also discriminates against children by way of 
birth.80 
77 And by extension under New Zealand law, "dissolving" marriages; Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, s 8, imposes a duty on legal advisers to promote 
reconciliation and conciliation. The interests of children must also be 
con idered by the court when dividing matrimonial property after dissolution; 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 26. 
78 Dissolution is a legal event that is descriptive only of the formal end to a 
marriage. 
79 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 11. 
80 Above n 70. 
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(c) The Rights of Women 
In the majority of instances it is the female partner to a de facto relationship who 
does not have legal title to the real property of the relationship.81 A major 
motivation for the implementation of legislation dealing with de facto property rights 
is to rectify the way in which the law of trusts has operated to the detriment of 
women.82 Motherhood is upheld and given special protection under our 
international obligations83 and yet this protection does not extend to the property 
rights of mothers whose de facto relationships end. It is difficult to argue that the 
current law, either as it affects mothers or nulliparous women, creates a "distinction, 
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex" .84 Although its effect is 
discriminatory, the basis for the discrimination is marital status and not gender. 
However the removal of such discriminatory effects would further protect the rights 
of all women, and indeed of all parents, particularly if it accounted for non-financial 
contributions to the relationship. 
Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women85 goes further and requires ratifying states 
81 A perusal of 28 trust law cases decided since 1984 revealed that in seven 
cases the title was in the woman's name and in three cases title was held 
jointly by both parties, giving a total of 37%, meaning that in 63% of cases 
the woman did not have legal title. 
82 "No Protection for De Facto Couples - MP", Otago Daily Times, above n 41. 
On the basis of decided ea e , a non-property owning spouse can expect to 
obtain between 15% - 40% of the property; above n 21, 259. See also the 
statistics noted in Part II A 4 (b). 
83 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25(2); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Article 12(2); International Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Article 24(2)(d). 
84 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Article 1. 
85 Ratified by New Zealand in 1984. 
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"to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women ... (h) the same rights for both 
pou es in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, 
enjoyment and disposition of property ... " (Emphasis added.) 
While the current law does not discriminate on a gender basis with regard to 
entitlement to any of the above property rights, its effect is to discriminate against 
women who do not make legal provision for property shared by virtue of their de 
facto relationship when compared with their married counterparts. Again the real 
inequity is between married and unmarried women.86 
2 Domestic Human Rights Legislation 
(a) The Human Rights Act 1993. 
The Human Rights Commission Act was passed in 1977 prior to the ratification by 
New Zealand of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1978. It has ince 
been succeeded by the Human Rights Act 1993.87 
Although the focus of the Human Rights Act 1993 is on human rights rather than on 
property rights, and although remedies for discrimination apply to specific areas8 
there remain several ways that the Act can be of influence. 
The prohibited grounds of discrimination, as extended by the 1993 Act, are an 
indication that the existing inequity between married and non-married people in 
regard to post-relationship property settlements is less tolerable. This is because the 
prohibited grounds indicate the types of groups and kind of ba es on which it is 
86 Although in practice this operates unfavourably in respect of women, the 
basis is a lack of marital statu , and this is equally applicable to men who are 
not legally entitled to real property, or other property of the de facto unit, or 
who have made non-financial contributions to the relationship. 
87 Which came into effect on l February 1994. 
8 Employment, housing and accommodation, education, the provision of goods 
and ervices and access to public places; Human Rights Act 1993, Part II. 
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unacceptable to discriminate. Given these extended grounds, this is also true in 
regard to relationships in the nature of marriage as well as to attitudes towards same 
sex relationships. The Human Rights Act 1993 also advances arguments that those 
in de facto relationships should be treated uniformly by all areas of the law. 
(i) Section 5 Powers 
Also of importance are the powers of the Commissioner under the Human Rights Act 
1993, section 5. The powers set out in section 5 are wide-ranging and have the 
potential to effect change in many ways. The Human Rights Commission can report 
to the Prime Minister on the implications of any proposed legislation.89 The 
Commission can also report to the Prime Minister on the desirability of legislative 
action.90 
The ability of these powers to be used in the context of de facto property rights is 
further enhanced by the Human Rights Act 1993, section 75(2)(e), which gives the 
Complaints Division of the Human Rights Commission the power to investigate of 
its own motion 
"any acl, omission, practice, requirement, or condition which is not apparently in 
breach of any of the provisions of Parl 11 of this Act but which has the effect of 
giving different trealmenl lo any group of persons where lhal group consists of 
persons against whom discrimination is unlawful by virtue of Part II of this Act". 
Therefore the Human Rights Commission is empowered to act should it be of the 
view that the current legal situation with regard to remedies for de facto property 
89 Human Rights Act 1993, s 5(h)(iii); this provision also existed in the Human 
Rights Commission Act 1977, s 6. The 1977 functions are repeated (Human 
Rights Act 1993, s 5(a),(b),(c) and (e)), but other functions have been added. 
90 Human Rights Act 1993, s 5(h)(i). 
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issues has the effect of giving different treatment to people "living in the nature of 
marriage". 91 
Section 5 also enables the Commission to prepare guidelines for the avoidance of 
discriminatory acts or practices, and section 5(f) allows it to consult with other 
bodies (such as the United Nations) that are concerned with the protection of human 
rights. 
The Commission has until 31 December 1998 to examine all Acts and regulations 
in force in New Zealand as well as all policies and administrative practices of the 
New Zealand government and determine whether these conflict with Part II of the 
Human Rights Act 1993 or infringe upon its spirit and intention.92 
(ii) Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination 
The Human Rights Act 1993 makes several important changes to the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. Under the 1977 Act the relevant prohibited ground 
referred solely to marital status. Marital status was not further defined and this 
created problems over whether de facto relationships were included within the 
definition.93 
The 1993 Act removed this doubt. Section 21(1)(a)(iv) includes "living in a 
relationship in the nature of marriage" within the definition of marital status. 
Presumably relationships that involve de facto couples that do not fall within the 
definition of a relationship "in the nature of marriage" can still be discriminated 
91 A group for which discrimination on areas covered by Part II of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 is unlawful; Human Rights Act 1993, s 2I(l)(b)(vi). See 
also section 5(g) which empowers the Commission to inquire generally into 
any matter. 
92 Human Rights Act 1993, s 5(1)(i) and U). 
93 Several interpretations of the definition in regard to de facto relationships 
were possible. See above n 1, 186. The Human Rights Commission issued 
a policy statement in 1984 to clarify that marital status did include de facto 
relationships. 
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against.94 It is therefore important to be able to define a relationship "in the nature 
of marriage". There exists a considerable body of common law on this subject, 
mostly in the area of social security law. 
Section 21(l)(m) Human Rights Act 1993 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation.95 It would therefore contravene the Human Rights Act to define 
functionally "marriage-like" relationships in a way that discriminated against same 
sex relationships . Many same sex relationships share marital characteristics including 
shared property, care of children, sexual relations and long term commitment. 
Further, the definition of marital status in section 21(l)(iv) makes no reference to the 
need for the parties to be a man and a woman. Clearly then, same sex relationships 
can be relationships in the nature of marriage. If a relationship in the nature of 
marriage can be entered into only by parties legally capable of marrying then not 
only would same sex relationships be excluded from the definition, but so would 
those relationships where marriage is not possible because, for example, one of the 
parties is still legally married to their former partner. 
Family status is a prohibited ground of discrimination.96 This is defined as 
"(i)Having the responsibility for part-time care or full-time care of children or other 
dependents: or 
(ii)Having no responsibility for part-time care or full-time care of children or other 
dependents" . 
If elements of this definition of family status are imported into a piece of legislation 
as proposed then it would also not be desirable from the Commissioner's point of 
view to distinguish between relationships on the basis of the presence of children. 
This may sit uneasily alongside functional arguments that centre on the family as a 
place of child rearing. However reconciliation is possible if emphasis is placed on 
94 Subject to arguments regarding family status and sexual orientation; below, 
later in this section, (Part III A 2(a)(ii)). 
95 Defined as "heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation". 
96 Human Rights Act 1993, s 2l(l)(])(iii). 
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supporting these families in a way that does not in any way disadvantage childless 
families. 
(b) The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The prohibition against discrimination on the grounds set out in the Human Rights 
Act 1993 is incorporated into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 97 further 
strengthening the impact of these prohibited grounds of discrimination in New 
Zealand. Section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (which effectively creates 
a further presumption to be applied when interpreting statutes), requires an 
interpretation of legislation that is consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
wherever possible. This would assist in an interpretation of legislation pertaining to 
de facto property rights that accords with New Zealand's anti-discrimination 
legislation.98 
Of importance is the effect of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 5, which 
states; 
"[s]ubject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society ." 
Use of the Human Rights Act grounds of prohibited discrimination via the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act would permit this limitation to be employed, whereas this 
would not be the case under the Human Rights Act alone a no such limitation is 
contained in the latter statute. 
Distinctions based on marital status may therefore be justified if the limitation set out 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 5, is justified. The New 
97 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19, as amended by the Human Rights 
Act 1993. 
98 This might become important if such legislation came under attack from those 
in moral, philosophical or political opposition. 
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Zealand Bill of Rights Act, section 17, also asserts a right to freedom of association. 
This promotes the right of a couple to live together without marrying and could also 
be used to justify the retention of distinctions between marriages and de facto 
relationships. 99 
(c) The Relationship Between International and Domestic Legislation 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 are 
interlinked as previously discussed. Both statutes also have links with United 
Nations documents. The long title of the former Act affirms New Zealand' 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while the 
long title of the latter statute states the aim of better protecting human rights in New 
Zealand in accordance with United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human 
Rights. These links mean that the arguments made relating to the interpretation of 
United Nations Conventions have direct relevance to interpretations of domestic anti-
discrimination legislation. 
3 Conclusions 
Legislation that introduced a scheme for the property division of de facto 
relationships would not transgress any of New Zealand's international obligations. 
Although none of the international instruments ratified by New Zealand prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of marital status, they do set out rights pertaining to 
motherhood and childhood as well as rights to found a family and to marry. The 
proposed legislation would add to some of these rights without derogating from any 
right to marry. 
Domestically, the Human Rights Act 1993, supported by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, while currently having no direct application to intra-relationship 
property rights, add impact to arguments that the current inequity between those who 
are covered by the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and those who are not needs 
99 Above n 1, 193. 
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rectification. The extension of prohibited grounds of discrimination on the grounds 
of marital status to include relationships in the nature of marriage, discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or family status indicates a widening of the kind of 
groups seen as deserving of protection. 
B ISSUES OF EQUIV ALENCY 
The central societal position of marriage has brought with it an inevitable comparison 
of de facto relationships (especially those that superficially resemble marriages) with 
marriages. This section of the paper looks at how de facto relationships should be 
treated vis a vis marriage and at whether there is merit in making the comparison. 
Complete equation with marriage may lead, for example, to wholesale application of 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 to de facto relationships, but such assumptions 
should not be made about every point discussed herein. Conversely, many of these 
arguments may support a call for a separate piece of legislation providing for de 
facto property division. 
As previously stated, the distinguishing factors between marriage and some de facto 
relationships are less obvious than they have been in the past. 100 Many de facto 
relationships are what might be termed "functional marriages", that is, they fulfil 
many of the same purposes and functions that marital relationships do. It is this 
factor, the fulfilment of family functions, that serves as a justification for equivalent 
treatment. 101 There have been many influences on this development. Socially, 
there has been both an increase in the incidence of de facto relationships and an 
increasing acceptance of this type of living arrangement. Legally, statute law has 
encompassed this wider notion of family in an increasing range of areas. Previously 
this consisted predominately of financial responsibility provisions such as those 
relating to child support, but now de facto couples caring for children receive cover 
100 See above, Part II A 1. 
101 This argument and others advanced in this section of the paper are found in 
Freeman and Lyon; above n 11, eh 6. 
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under statutes that entitle them to processes aimed at keeping the family unit 
intact. 102 Thus the rise in importance of the functional family is reflected in the 
operation of the law. The courts have also played an influential role through the 
extension of the application of the common law using the fulfilment of family 
functions as a basis for decision making. 103 
The presence of children has been a factor of increasing importance. This separates 
de facto relationships into those with children and those without, and there are many 
that faJJ into the latter category. While there are sound policy reasons for protecting 
the rights of children, a blanket extension of marital property law to all de facto 
couples with children is not a satisfactory solution because questions remain, such 
as responsibility for children that were part of the de facto unit but not the biological 
children of the parties. 104 In many ways the Child Support Act 1991 has set out 
the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties, but it does so in respect of the 
maintenance of children and not in respect of the resolution of property disputes of 
their unmarried parents. The existence of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 may 
be an indication of the need for a regime dealing with property issues that is separate 
from issues of child support. 105 
The duration of the relationship is another comparison point between marriages and 
de facto relationships. 106 The duration of the relationship is a consideration of the 
102 For example, Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 7 A(l )(b ); above n 24. 
103 For example, claims under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 
1949, where "services" are considered in the light of the con ortium between 
the claimant and the deceased; above n 1, 169; P R H Webb et al (eds) 
Butterworths Family Law Service (6 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1993) 
1011. 
IQ.1 It is acknowledged that these problems also arise on the dissolution of 
marriage. 
105 This is not to deny that the two issues are inextricably linked. 
106 This is dealt with in more detail in Part III C 4. It is suggested that any 
statute dealing with de facto property rights would have to deal with this 
issue in some way, either by making duration one factor along with others 
that would determine the existence of a justiciable relationship, or by making 
cover under the scheme dependent on duration of a specified length. 
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courts when determining relationships in the nature of marriage for social security 
purposes, although admittedly, due to the nature of the enquiry, most of these 
relationships are examined in their early stages. While it would be inappropriate and 
unworkable for the law to become involved in property issues consequent upon the 
termination of transient or ephemeral relationships, if it i to deal with de facto 
property rights then the issue of duration must be addressed. Problem may arise as 
the beginning of a de facto relationship is not always easy to determine and it may 
not be entered into with any intention of longevity. However, this may also be true 
of marriages where a life-long commitment has been replaced by a commitment to 
stay in the marriage as long as it retains at least a minimal level of satisfaction. 107 
Marriage-like behaviour, including the expression of a future intention to marry, has 
been used as an indicator in determining a relationship in the nature of marriage. 
Atkin 108 points out that this is covered by the Domestic Actions Act 197 5 and finds 
little force in the argument that relationships involving an unfulfilled intention to 
marry be treated as marriage-like relationships. It should also be noted that the aim 
of the Domestic Actions Act 1975 is to put the parties back into the position that 
they would have been in had there been no agreement to marry. 109 The nature of 
the relationship, particularly attitudes towards sex and money, may also be indicative 
of a relationship in the nature of marriage. 
Another justification for equivalent treatment is that there is a need to protect the 
weaker family members. It may be argued that the very structure of the family unit, 
based as it is on a patriarchal system, has led to the existence of weaker family 
members and that this has been bolstered by the private nature of family life and a 
history of non-interference with it. The area of domestic violence is one area where 
the need to protect the weaker family members has resulted in the removal of 
107 "[Marital] success [is] judged more on happines and emotional satisfaction 
which are difficult to achieve, rather than on economic and child rearing 
factors"; above n 52, 41. 
108 Above n 1, 191. Arguments discussed in this section can be found in this 
text in eh 10. 
109 Domestic Actions Act 1975, 8(3). 
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distinctions based on marital status. 11 0 The focus, in terms of any imbalance of 
power, now centres on the place of children within the family. The increasing 
importance of the rights and needs of children of de facto unions has been a major 
impetus for the decreasing focus on the marital status, or lack of one, of parents. 
Atkin argues that the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, as the statute that governs the 
property disputes of divorced couples, cannot be used to equate marriages with de 
facto relationships in a way that treats them as equivalent states, because that Act is 
not premised on the alleviation of need, but rather on a partnership between 
equals. 111 This statutory presumption of equality, which led to a presumption of 
equality of entitlement to the property of the relationship, was necessary because of 
the societal and legal influences that led to the imbalance. The same inability to 
adequately compensate non-financial contributions to the relationship has led to 
problems in trust law solutions to de facto property rights. The same forces apply 
to both types of relationships and therefore, although there is no standard marriage 
or de facto relationship, there exist the same reasons for addressing this imbalance. 
There may be cases where parties to a de facto relationship have not made equal 
contributions, particularly in the extent of property they bring to the relationship. 
However, if they are to be treated as functional marriages then a premise of equal 
sharing is justified. Many marriages (especially second marriages) suffer from the 
same inequality, and yet the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 appears able to provide 
for these situations. 11 2 Further, a de facto property rights statute would not be 
premised on the alleviation of need, but rather on achieving a fair result based upon 
the nature of, and respective contributions to, the relationship. 
Atkin adds two further arguments that may justify equivalent treatment. 113 First, 
that "justice" requires that the situation be rectified to alleviate perceived injustices 
and hardship. It is the perceived inequity , apparent because outcomes of property 
11 0 Domestic Protection Act 1982, ss 2, 4, 13. 
111 Above n 1, 191. 
11 2 Through such provisions as ss 14 and 21. 
11 3 Above n 1, 192. 
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disputes indicate individual hardship, that has prompted many of the calls for 
change. 114 Secondly, there is the argument that in substance de facto relationships 
are the same as marriage. This appears to refer to arguments about familial 
functions, and of course not all de facto relationships fall into this category. There 
remain substantial differences between marriage and de facto relationships, with 
marriage being a legal status not dependent on any inquiry as to its functions or its 
quality. 115 
While marriage retains its central place in society, it is important that such a state-
sanctioned status does not become less advantageous than other types of unions. To 
do so would be in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 and may have the effect of 
lowering the numbers of people who choose to enter into marriage. This in turn may 
give rise to perceptions of moral decay which may have political ramifications. 
Legally, the wholesale equating of all de facto relationships (however defined) with 
marriage would also have a deleterious effect. 116 It would do so by fostering the 
impression that there remained no legal distinction between married and unmarried 
couples. If the type of de facto relationship to qualify under the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 was wider than relationships in the nature of marriage, then the 
Act could eventually cover relationships that would bear little resemblance to 
marriage. If cover was limited to relationships in the nature of marriage it is possible 
that the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 could be used to resolve property issues. 
This would not remove the need to separately define a relationship in the nature of 
marriage. It may assist both the court and the general public to recognise that these 
"marriage-like" relationships are deserving of a scheme similar to the property 
division scheme under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. However, because of the 
perceived need to maintain some distinction between marriage and de facto 
relationships, and to separate them as distinct choices, as well as enabling the 
114 "Tizard Bill supported" Nelson Evening Mail, Nelson, New Zealand, 7 June 
1994, 3. 
11 5 Atkin also argues that international law and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 preclude equivalent treatment. These arguments were taken up in 
Part III A. 
11 6 Above n 28, 169. 
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incorporation of elements of overseas de facto property rights legislation, it 1s 
submitted that a statute dealing solely with de facto property rights be enacted. 
The issue is one of comparison rather than one of equivalency. There exist both 
similarities and distinguishing factors between marriages and de facto relationships. 
A separate de facto property rights statute would retain an important distinction 
between marriage and de facto relationships and would allow issues of particular 
relevance to de facto couples, such as the duration of the relationship, to be dealt 
with separately. 
C DEFINING A DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP 
1 Who to Include? 
There are several options regarding the type of relationship that could be captured 
by any statutory regime. One is to limit cover to relationships that are "in the nature 
of marriage". Clearly, this measures a de facto relationship along the marital 
yardstick. In its favour, both the judiciary and government officials have had 
experience in quantifying and assessing de facto relationships in this way. 117 These 
decisions have also been recorded and thus could be used as a guideline to determine 
a basic scheme (perhaps containing a list of indicative factors) to be set out in a 
statute. Care needs to be taken with this approach as it must be borne in mind that 
decisions of definition that relate to fiscal policies such as child maintenance and the 
payment of domestic purposes benefits have a different (and arguably wider) purpose 
than do decisions relating to inter-party property rights. If the underlying policy and 
intentions of a statutory scheme dealing with de facto property right were explicit 
then some of the issues surrounding definition may be more easily answered. 
117 Although this is not without problems. "It [the term de facto hu band and 
wife] is a term obfuscatory of any legal principle except in distinguishing the 
relationship from that of husband and wife." Calverley v Green [ 1985] 59 
ALR 111. 
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However it may be desirable that consideration be given to relationships that, 
although marriage-like, are not presently considered to be in the nature of marriage 
for most of the state's purposes. This would include same sex relationships. The 
Human Rights Act 1993 omits the words "a man and a woman" from its definition 
of living together as a marital status and therefore same sex relationships could fall 
within this definition. On a functional basis, there would be a significant number of 
same sex relationships that would perform similar or the same functions as marriage. 
This would involve extending our current notion that marriage can only exist between 
one man and one woman. 118 
A definition based on a "functional marriage" measure would clearly have the 
intention of merely extending some of the current benefits of marital status to a wider 
group on the basis that this wider group consisted of "marriages by another name". 
As previously discussed there are reasons for doing so on this basis, strengthened by 
the rising emphasis on the rights of children. But this focus may also be perceived 
as one that is relatively narrow. It would exclude other relationships where there is 
an exchange, such as the provision of financial support in exchange for support of 
a domestic nature, that may justify one party having rights to the property of the 
other. 
Therefore, another alternative would be to extend cover to all "domestic 
relationships". This approach has been favoured in the Australian Capital Territory, 
where the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) defines domestic relationship 
as' 19 
"a personal relationship between 2 adults (other than a married couple) in which one 
provides personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the 
material benefit of the other". 
118 This is a deeply embedded cultural concept, although it 1s not a specific 
requirement of the Marriage Act 1955. 
119 Section 3. The domestic relationship must have existed for at least 2 years; 
s 12. 
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Although it is yet too early to discern how this Act will be interpreted, section 3 
clearly covers situations of both dependence and inter-dependence. 
The introduction of relationships that extend beyond that of functional families needs 
to be looked at in terms of its philosophical and policy bases. The interests of the 
state in terms of resolving property disputes of families have been examined. 120 
The domestic relationship approach appears to be based on estoppel type principles 
and would cover those relationships where an exchange has taken place without any 
connotations of a sexual relationship.121 The interests of the state in these 
situations appears to be less obvious, although providing recompense that recognises 
the efforts of a party to a domestic relationship is a salutary aim. 
The consideration given m this paper to the extension of cover to same sex 
relationships is based on the concept of a monogamous sexual relationship. 
Therefore, while it challenges heterosexist notions of marriage and the need for 
formal registration, it does not challenge other marital concepts. Multi-party and 
non-sexual relationships do challenge these concepts. 122 It is submitted that to 
include them in a legislative proposal at this stage would increase the level of 
opposition to the Bill to a level that may hinder its passage. The debate may be 
worthwhile, but it would run the risk of confusing the issues of supporting functional 
marriages with supporting other forms of association. 
120 See Part II A 3. 
12 1 For example children caring for elderly parents. The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Domestic Relationships Bill states "[i]t should be made 
clear that the relationship is to involve a commitment which goes beyond 
friendship and 'neighbourliness ' - flatmate , people living in group houses, 
employed live-in housekeepers and other domestic employment. Those living 
in halls of residence for employees or students would also not normally be 
entitled to seek relief", 2. 
122 The former challenges monogamy and the latter the notion of conferring 
rights and responsibilities based on a sexual bond and procreation. 
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2 Beginnings and Endings 
The lack of a precise time of commencement of a de facto relationship is one of the 
major differences between those relationships and marriages, and one that could 
prove to be one of the most problematic in terms of establishing statutory cover. 
Marriage is marked by ceremony and registration and therefore its beginning point 
is determinable without difficulty. In contrast, a de facto relationship may have no 
clear starting point, either to the parties themselves or to the rest of the 
community. 123 Therefore, in each case the commencement of the relationship will 
be a matter of fact and will need to be established. Once again, assistance could be 
derived from the existing body of law on relationships in the nature of marriage, but 
there will be many cases where the determination of a beginning point will be far 
from easy. In attempting this exercise, an approach that looked at what was within 
the contemplation of the parties using a mixture of subjective and objective tests 
could be employed. Thus a court would look at when the parties thought the 
relationship began and at the impression they gave to others. As well as this, 
provision could be made for state registration of de facto relationships at the 
instigation and with the consent of both partners to the relationship. 124 This would 
provide some clarification and would avoid the need to litigate on this particular 
issue, but this saving in litigation would be minimal because it presumes that the 
parties are able to agree on a starting date (these couples would therefore not be 
arguing the issue whether in of out of court) . For registration to be an effective 
solution it would need to be able to be retrospective, subject to the consent of both 
parties. Admittedly, these solutions would still not avoid the existence of the "grey 
area cases". 
123 Some de facto relationships will not suffer from this problem. It is not 
uncommon for there to be a commencement date that relates to one party 
moving into the same dwelling as the other. 
124 In terms of the scope of this paper, this would be for the sole purpose of 
determining the commencement of the relationship for the purposes of the 
statute relating to de facto property right . 
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The end of a de facto relationship would appear to be less problematic, or at least 
to have some commonality with the end of a marriage. Although marriage has a 
formal registered end point, dissolution is preceded by a process of relationship 
deterioration that is an internal matter for the parties to the marriage. Dissolution is 
available two years after the "irretrievable breakdown of the marriage" 125 which is 
an event or series of events determined by the parties and marked by the end of 
cohabitation. 126 
Beginnings and endings may also occur within a relationship, where the parties 
resume cohabitation after a period of separation. This may impact upon the duration 
question in that it may be difficult to determine the length of an intermittent 
relationship. 
3 Overseas Solutions 
Sweden granted limited property rights to unmarried cohabitants under the Law on 
Cohabitants' Mutual Home (1987). 127 It covers marriage-like relationships and 
includes same sex relationships. 128 The Act uses a system of deferred community 
property, which consists of the family home and chattels but excludes items of 
recreational use and objects used exclusively by one partner. 129 Parties are able to 
contract out of the Act. 
125 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 39(1). 
126 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 39(2) states that it is necessary to prove that 
the parties have been living apart for two years and that this is the ole 
ground for establishing that the marriage has broken down irreconcilably. 
127 M Fawcett "Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish Legislation Grants 
Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants" (1990) 24 Fam LQ 179. 
128 Extension to same sex relationships was given under a separate law; above 
n 127, 185. 
129 Above n 127, 187. 
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The issue has also met with a legislative response in Australia. The De Facto 
Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) covers heterosexual de facto relationships 130 which 
have lasted two years or longer. 131 The court can make a variety of orders 
adjusting or declaring the property interests of the partners and contracting out of the 
Act is permitted. 132 
The Property Law (Amendment) Act 1987 (Viet) is modelled on the New South 
Wales legislation and is of similar effect. 
The Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) has been previously discussed. 133 Its 
application extends wider than sexual relationships although the type of court orders 
available are similar to the New South Wales legislation. The Australian Capital 
Territory statute allows parties to contract out of the Act 134 but the Victorian statute 
does not. 
4 Duration 
One noticeable effect of measuring de facto relationships against marriage has been 
the importance placed on a degree of permanence of the relationship. Whether or not 
this is borne out by the actual duration of the relationship, it is considered important 
for the parties to have had a degree of long term commitment at some point. Indeed 
it might prove both cumbersome and inappropriate for the law to become involved 
in the reallocation of inter-party rights and resources in relationships that are 
transitory. If this is so, then once the starting point of a de facto relationship is 
130 Defined as "living or having lived together as husband and wife on a bona 
fide domestic basis although not married to each other". 
131 Unless there are children of the relationship or one party has made a 
substantial contribution for which they will otherwise remain uncompensated; 
De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), 3(1). 
132 De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), Part IV. 
133 See Part III C l. 
134 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), Part IV. 
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established, its duration will have some bearing on whether it comes within a 
statutory scheme. Duration can either be placed as one factor alongside others that 
determine entry into the scheme, (as in the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW)), 
or it can be elevated to an entry status of its own, (for example five years duration 
where there are children of the relationship, under the Family Relationships Act 1975 
(SA)).13s 
As the matter of duration must be addressed in some form, it may be that a 
requirement of this nature is a distinction based on marital status that is "justified in 
a free and democratic society" .136 If such a provision was considered 
discriminatory, so would the distinction in the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 on the 
basis of a marriage of short duration. 137 The Marriage Act 1955 and statutes such 
as the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 create distinctions based on marital status and 
yet do not appear to have been challenged under anti-discrimination provisions. 
5 A Legislative Definition? 
If legislation is to be enacted there are several options regarding this issue of 
definition. The law could define a de facto relationship in detail. The application 
of a formula may add certainty but its lack of flexibility detracts from its usefulness 
as an option. It would avoid the value judgements of the judiciary but it would 
substitute those of the legislature. 
The law could avoid a definition altogether and leave the concept to be shaped by 
the judiciary. This would perhaps be too uncertain and would make it difficult for 
people to organise their affairs with the aim of creating a de ired legal re ult. Both 
the benefits and detriments of this approach can be seen in the case law that 
developed under the Social Security Act 1964, ection 27 A where the legislative 
phrase "in the nature of marriage" became detailed in itemised list . 
135 A tatute dealing with the legitimacy of children. 
136 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
137 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 13. 
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A middle ground would be for the law to set out certain benchmark factors, for 
example the requisite duration of a de facto relationship under a law of property 
division, or perhaps list factors for the judiciary to take into account, and then leave 
the mechanics of application to particular relationships to the judiciary. This would 
provide some guidance while still retaining flexibility. 
Broad definitions are useful because they can be creatively adapted to cover a wide 
range a relationships. But they do place discretion in the hands of those charged 
with deciding whether a relationship comes within the definition. Importantly, the 
decision is once again removed from the parties themselves, although their views on 
what they consider to be the nature of the relationship will no doubt carry some 
weight. 
6 Conclusions 
Defining a de facto relationship is no easy task. The commencement, duration and 
termination of such relationships all contain issues that could prove problematic in 
drafting an appropriate piece of legislation, as might the question of who to include 
within a definition. Some jurisdictions have tackled these issues. Attention i now 
given to a legislative solution that is tailored to the social and legal environment in 
New Zealand. 
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IV A LEGISLATIVE SCHEME: 
COMMENTARY 
A INTRODUCTION 
This section of the paper provides background information regarding the rea ons for 
the adoption of approaches and provisions outlined in the draft legislation proposed 
in Part V. In doing so it supplements the explanatory notes given throughout the De 
Facto Property Rights Bill. 
B COVER AND CODIFICATION 
The issue of cover for any proposed statutory scheme partly relates to the type of 
relationship that will come within the scope of the legislation. The issue of defining 
a de facto relationship is covered in Part III C where reasons are given for cover to 
extend to marriage-like relationships, including same sex relationships. Cover also 
refers to the method by which those couples, however defined, come within the Act. 
Should such a scheme have mandatory and automatic application to any relationship 
coming within the definition under the Act, or should such regulation only take effect 
through the positive act of the parties? It is submitted that the best solution is to 
provide universal cover with a provision for the parties to contract out of the 
statutory provisions if they so wish. Thi sugge ted application is the approach 
followed by the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and it has several advantages. The 
contracting out provision in section 21 allows the partie autonomy and freedom to 
choose a method of property division that suits their individual needs. Thus it 
counters arguments that the tatute would impose a regime on individuals who 
deliberately choose not to marry in order to avoid the ramifications of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976, as it would only impose such an effect on those who 
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take no action. The opportunity for another approach and outcome would be 
retained. 
The automatic application would safeguard the interests of the majority of de facto 
couples who make no provision for property division on the breakdown of their 
relationship. 138 Currently this inaction has led to inequities. Alternatively, to 
provide cover only to those who "registered" under the Act would only capture those 
with the financial means and forethought to seek cover. 139 It is submitted that even 
the most extensive advertising campaign on the part of the state would fail to 
adequately address the need for education regarding the respective differences of 
choosing to enter the scheme or electing not to. 
Provision for contracting out is not without its problems. It involves the expense of 
obtaining legal advice, and may place a relationship under strain where consensus on 
the terms of the agreement is protracted or contentious. Adoption of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976, section 21 would mean that the court could avoid or vary an 
agreement on grounds that are much wider than contract. This amounts to a major 
encroachment on the autonomy of the parties. 
A further issue regarding cover is the retrospectivity of the statute. If the Act were 
to apply to all de facto relationships in existence at the time it came into force then 
it may be argued that these relationships would become subject to a what would 
amount to a legal imposition. However, if extensive publicity were to surround the 
introduction of the Act and the ability to contract out of it, and considering that the 
Act has a remedial focus, these concerns could be alleviated. The law makes many 
impositions on the private ordering of the lives of its citizens and legal imposition 
in the family law area include the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and the Child 
138 Before the introduction of legi lation in Sweden only approximately 5% of 
de facto couples made written contracts relating to property division; above 
n 127, 191 n 65. 
139 The proposed scheme makes this so for those wishing to escape the 
provisions of the statute. 
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Support Act 1991. Both of these statutes have a very marked effect on those who 
come within their ambit. 
It is also suggested that the scheme provide comprehensive and exclusive cover. It 
would therefore act as a codification of the law. 140 This would mean that pre-
existing cohabitation contracts would cease to have effect, and would need to be re-
regi tered under the Act. Codification would clarify the position with regard to the 
applicability of the pre-existing law. It is preferable to begin with a statute that is 
clearly separate from the trust law principles currently applied. Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976 principles adopted would naturally bring with them application of judge 
made law on the particular issue or section concerned. 
The Act would replace normal contractual rules, and thus apply a uniform scheme 
to all relationships coming within it. 
C THE BASIS FOR APPLICATION 
The Matrimonial Property Act 1963 was criticised for its emphasis on assets. While 
it did also look at contributions to those assets through the marriage relationship, and 
the judiciary were given specific direction to look at 141 
"the respective contributions of the husband and wife to the property in dispute 
(whether in the form of money payments, service , prudent management, or 
otherwise howsoever)" 
scant regard was given to non-financial contribution . The statutory direction left a 
large amount of discretion with the presiding judge, and it was this factor, in the 
hand of traditionalists, that resulted in a division of property of less than 50% for 
140 A statement regarding the codification position could be made in the usual 
statutory form in order to avoid confusion. 
141 Matrimonial Property Act 1963, s 6. 
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the overwhelming majority of wives. In 1968 142 the legislature amended section 
6 to state that an order vesting an interest in property may be made to either party 
"notwithstanding that he or she made no contribution to the property in the form of 
money payments or that his or her contribution in any other form was of a usual and 
not an extraordinary character. " 
This also proved to be insufficient and the issue was further tackled by the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976. Again the concern was the division of assets of the 
marriage, and these were classified as either matrimonial or separate property. The 
relative contributions of the parties were presumed to be equal with regard to the 
sharing of the matrimonial home and chattels. The notion of contribution was also 
strengthened, and given a detailed listing in section 18(1). Section 18(2) also clearly 
stated that greater weight was not to be given to financial contributions over 
non-financial ones. 
If a de facto property sharing regime were to start from the notion of a partnership 
of equals (which would be able to be departed from where the circumstances made 
it fair to do so), then, like the 1976 Act, the emphasis would be on assessing the 
relationship in global terms and dividing the property of the relationship on the basis 
of overall contribution to the relationship. This would move away from the asset by 
asset approach that is necessary under the law of trusts. The concept of contribution 
should be wide ranging in order to capture the diversity of relationships covered. 
Section 18(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 should be incorporated as should 
the presumption of equal sharing. Non-financial contributions should be counted 
from the duration date of the relationship, as established by the court. 
As coverage is given on a "functional family" basi , an assessment of the relationship 
from the presumption of a partnership of equals is justified on the ame grounds as 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. Admittedly there will be relationships where 
this is not appropriate and the Bill makes provision for these, again following a 
142 Matrimonial Property Amendment Act 1968. 
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Matrimonial Property Act 1976 model. The overriding emphasis is on achieving a 
result that is fair to both partners. 
D PROCEDURE 
The Family Court should be the court with jurisdiction to hear disputes involving de 
facto property rights. This is because of its special ability to deal with disputes that, 
although proprietary in nature, concern interrelational aspects. It would al o be 
sensible to utilise the same court that would be hearing any custody or access 
disputes arising out of the breakdown of the family unit. The tenets of privacy and 
informality are well suited to the resolution of these disputes. It is important that 
court assisted dispute resolution of this kind be assessable and therefore issue of the 
cost of bringing proceedings needs to be addressed. As with the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976, provision should be made to allow cases to be heard in the High 
Court where appropriate. 
E CONCLUSIONS 
Any legislative scheme dealing with de facto property rights needs to deal with a 
variety of issues including the extent of cover, the relationship with the common law, 
and the kinds of presumptions and approaches to be made. More importantly, it 
needs to be based on a clear and ound philosophy so that the direction for 
implementation will be obvious. 
The preceding sections of thi paper have attempted to provide such a foundation, 
and it is on this that the following section, containing a draft Bill on de facto 
property rights, is constructed. 
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IV LEGISLATION: THE DE FACTO 
PROPERTY RIGHTS BILL 
A INTRODUCTION 
This Bill sets out a proposal for legislation to provide remedy for de facto property 
rights on the breakdown of relationships. Its basic scheme is similar to the 
Matrimonial Property Rights Act 1976. It operates on a system of deferred 
community property and provides a classification system for communal and separate 
property. There are, however some differences from the statutory cover provided for 
married couples. These and other points, such as the use of provisions from 
Australian legislation, are set out in the explanatory note that follows in italic after 
each clause. The Bill is of limited coverage and there are everal important 
om1ss1ons which would need to be considered before any such legislation was 
presented. These include issues of succession, division of rural property, issues 
relating to creditors and other affected third parties, superannuation, valuation and de 
facto minors. 
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B THE BILL 
DE FACTO PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ANALYSIS 
Title 15. Misconduct 
I. Short Title and Commencement Agreements 
2. Interpretation 16. Power to make agreements 
3. Act to bind Crown Court Orders 
4. Act to be a code 17. Division of property 
5. Commencement of relationship 18. Court orders 
6. Applications under this Act 19. Jurisdiction 
7. Time limit for making application Proceedings Under Act 
8. Prerequisite for making order 20. Appeals 
Classification of Property 21. Interests of children 
9. Communal property defined 22. Interests of other parties 
10. Separate property 23. Duty of Court 
I I. Property acquired by succession etc 24. Proceedings to be held in private 
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A BILL INTITULED 
An Act to make provision for proceedings as to property between partners to 
a de facto relationship; to recognise the equal contribution of partners to the 
partnership; and to provide for a just division of the property of the partnership 
at the termination of the relationship. 
Justification for treating marriage-like relationships like marriages with regard to 
the presumption of equal sharing is given in Part III C 1. The overriding emphasis 
is on just division. The Bill does provide for other approaches where appropriate 
given the facts of the relationship before the Court. 
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BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follow : 
1. Short Title and Commencement-(1) This Act may be cited a the De 
Facto Property Rights Act 1994. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1 st day of February 1995. 
The short title provides a clear indication of the scope of the Bill. The shorthand 
term "de facto" has a commonly accepted meaning. "Property rights" indicates the 
concern with property as opposed to other factors such as paternity or custody or 
personal rights. 
2. Interpretation-Cl) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
"Child of the relationship" means-
(a) A child born as a result of a exual relations between the 
partners; or 
(b) Any child who resided with the parties on a full time basis 
before they ceased to live together, whether that child is a child of 
one or both of the parties or not; or 
(c) A child for whom both partners to the relationship accept 
responsibility for long term welfare: 
This definition recognises the increasing existence of blended families and the need 
to define children of the relationship wider than those arising from blood ties. The 
relationship between this provision and the Child Support Act 1991 needs to be fully 
explored, as does the need to include children conceived by assisted reproductive 
technology. The categories overlap. A foster child or step-child, for example, may 
come within clause 2(l)(b) or (c), but both provisions are necessary to cover 
situations where this is not so. The clause is an amalgam of provisions found in the 
De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) and the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 
(ACT). 
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"Contribution" include -
(a) The care of any child of the partie or of the household or any 
infirm relative or dependant of the partners; 
(b) Financial and non-financial contribution made directly or 
indirectly by or on behalf of either or both of the partners to the 
acquisition, con ervation or improvement of any of the property or 
financial re ource of either or both of them; 
(c) Any contributions made in the capacity of homemaker or 
parent, made by either of the partners to the welfare of the family: 
Although less specific than the Matrimonial Property Act, the scope of these 
contributions is intended to be as broad. It is intended that these will be assessed 
globally as contributions to the relationship as a whole. 
"De facto relationship" means a relationship where the partie are living 
together or have lived together in the nature of marriage, although not 
married to each other, for a period of 3 years, and includes uch 
relationships where the parties are of the same sex: 
The choice of "in the nature of marriage" means that use can be made of existing 
case law that defines what this means at a factual level. Not addressed, but of 
importance, is the issue of breaks in the continuity of relationships. Statutory 
provision would need to be made for this. The confinement to marriage-like 
relationships is deliberately cautious, and extension of the Act to other forms of 
domestic relationships could occur at a later date. The time period of three years 
means that the law does not apply to ephemeral or transitory relationships ( except 
where the conditions of s 8 are met), and it equates with the time at which a 
marriage no longer becomes one of short duration under the Matrimonial Property 
Act. Homosexual relationships are included to accord with the Human Rights Act 
1993. 
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"Family chattels"-
(a) Means chattels owned by either partner to the relationship or 
both of them and which are-
(i) Household furniture or household appliances, effects, or 
equipment; or 
(ii) Articles of household or family use or amenity or of 
household ornament, including tools, garden effects and 
equipment; or 
(iii) Motor vehicles, caravans, trailers, boats, windsurfers or 
bicycles used wholly or principally, in each case, for family 
purpo es; or 
(iv) Accessories of a chattel to which subparagraph (iii) of this 
paragraph applies; or 
(v) Household pets; and 
(b) Includes any of the chattels mentioned in paragraph (a) of thi 
definition which are in the possession of either partner pursuant to 
a hire purchase or conditional sale agreement or an agreement for 
lease or hire; but 
(c) But does not include chattels used wholly or principally for 
business purposes, or money or securities for money: 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 2. Windsurfers and bicycles are added to 
acknowledge developments in recreation. These items can be of considerable value. 
"Family home" means the dwellinghouse that is used habitually or from 
time to time by both partners to the relationship or by either of them as 
the only or principal family re idence, together with any land, buildings, 
or improvements appurtenant to any such dwellinghouse and used wholly 
or principally for the purposes of the household: 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 2. 
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"Property" includes real and per onal property and any estate or interest 
in property real or personal, and any debt, and any thing in action, and 
any other right or interest with respect to property: 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
3. Act to bind Crown-This Act shall bind the Crown. 
4. Act to be a code-(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
this Act shall have effect in place of the rules and presumptions of the 
common law and of equity. 
(2) Where proceedings have been commenced under this Act, no claim hall 
lie under the Domestic Actions Act 1975. 
Added for clarity and to prevent trust law principles from applying. Existing 
cohabitation contracts would have to be re-registered under this Act. For further 
explanation see Part IV B. Subsection (2) prevents "double dipping". 
5. Commencement of Relationship--(1) This Act shall apply to all de facto 
relationships whether such relationship commenced before or after the 
commencement date of this Act. 
(2) This Act shall not apply to a de facto relationship that ceased to exist 
before this Act came into force. 
All existing relationships are covered rather than having an "opt-in" situation. Prior 
relationships are not covered as this would be unduly retrospective. 
6. Applications under this Act-(1) Application under this Act may be made 
by a partner to a de facto relationship for the adjustment of interests with 
respect to the property of the de facto partners or either of them. 
7. Time limit for making application-Cl) Except as provided by sub ection 
(2) of this section, where de facto partners have ceased to live together, an 
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application to the Court for an order under this Act shall be made before the 
expiration of three years after the day on which they ceased, or last ceased, 
as the case may require, to so live together. 
(2) The Court may, at any time after the expiration of the period referred to 
in subsection (1) of this section, grant leave to a de facto partner to apply to 
the Court under this Act, where the Court is satisfied, having regard to such 
matters it considers relevant, that greater hardship would be caused to the 
applicant if that leave were not granted than would be caused to the 
respondent if that leave were granted. 
The three year period has been calculated to equate with the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976, which allows for 12 months from the date of dissolution which can take 
place two years after the relationship has irreconcilably broken down at the earliest. 
Subsection 2 allows this time period to be extended to prevent injustice in individual 
cases. CJ Property Law (Amendment) Act 1987, s 282 (Viet). 
8. Prerequisite for making order-(1) Except as provided by subsection (2) 
of this section, the Court shall not have jurisdiction to hear an application 
under this Act unless it is satisfied that the parties to the application have 
lived together in a de facto relationship for a period of not less than 3 years. 
(2) The Court may make an order under this Act where it is satisfied-
(a) That there is a child of the parties to the application; or 
(b) That the applicant-
(i) Has made substantial contributions to the relationship for which 
the applicant would otherwise not be adequately compensated if the 
order were not made; or 
(ii) Has the care and control of a child of the other de facto partner, 
and that the failure to make the order would result in erious 
injustice to the applicant. 
(3) The Court may conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the 
parties have lived in a de facto relationship for a period of 3 years. 
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This discretion exists to alleviate cases of individual hardship and again empha i e 
the importance of children. It recognises that the main thru t of the Bill i ll'itlz 
longer term relationships, although there may be exceptions to the rule. Subsection 
2, cf De Facto Relationships Act 1984, s 17(2) ( SW); Property La\\' Amendment 
Act 1987, s 281(2) (Viet). Subsection 3 allows for detennination of a definition of 
the relations/zip to be dealt with as a preliminary matter and i a procedural point. 
Classification of Property 
9. Communal property defined-Communal property hall con i t of-
(1) The family home; and 
(2) The family chattels; and 
(3) All property acquired by either party after the commencement of the 
relationship; and 
(4) Any income and gains derived from, the proceeds of any di position 
of, and any increase in the value of, any property de cribed in thi 
section; and 
(5) Any policy of assurance taken out by one partner on his or her own 
life or the life of the other partner, whether for hi or her own benefit or 
for the benefit of the other partner (not being a policy that was fully paid 
up at the time the de facto relationship was entered into and not being 
a policy to the proceeds of which a third per on i beneficially entitled), 
whether the proceed are payable on the death of the a ured or on the 
occurrence of a specified event or otherwi e; and 
(6) Any policy of insurance in respect of any property de cribed in thi 
section; and 
(7) Any pension, benefit, or right to which either party is entitled or may 
become entitled under any superannuation scheme if the entitlement i 
derived, wholly or in part, from contributions made to the scheme after 
the marriage or from employment or office held ince the time that the 
relationship began; and 
(8) All other property that the partners have agreed, pursuant to section 
16 of this Act, shall be communal property; and 
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(9) Any other property that i communal property by virtue of any other 
provi ion of thi Act or by virtue of any other Act. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 8. Communal property is equivalent to 
matrimonial property. 
10. Separate property-Separate property mean -(1) All property of either 
partner which is not communal property; and 
(2) All property li ted in a section 16 agreement (validly con ented to by both 
parties) as separate property; and 
(3) Separate property used to acquire, improve or rncrea e the value of 
communal property shall become communal property. 
(4) All property acquired by either partner to the relationship while they are 
not living together in the nature of marriage shall be eparate property unle 
the Court considers that it is just in the circumstances to treat such property 
or any part thereof as communal property. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 9. Again the scheme of the Matrimonial 
Property Act applies. 
11. Property acquired by succession etc-(1) Property, being-
( a) Property acquired by succession or by survivorship or as a 
beneficiary under a trust or by gift from a third person: or 
(b) The proceeds of any disposition of property to which paragraph (a) 
of this subsections applies,-
shall not be communal property unless, with the express or implied con ent 
of the partner to the relationship who received it, the property or the proceeds 
of any disposition of it have been so intermingled with other communal 
property that it is unreasonable or impracticable to regard that property or 
those proceeds as being separate property. 
(2) Property acquired by gift from the other partner shall not be communal 
property unless the gift is used for the benefit of both partners to the 
relationship. 
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(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this section and s 10(4) of this 
Act, both the family home and the family chattels shall be communal 
property unless designated separate property by an agreement made in 
accordance with section 16 of this Act. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s JO. 
12. Division of communal property-Unless section 13 of this Act applies, 
under any proceedings under this Act, the communal property of the 
relationship shall be divided equally between the partners to the relationship. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 1 l; based on the presumption of a partnership 
of equals in the Long title to the Bill. 
13. Departure from scheme of Act-( 1) Where there are circumstances that, 
in the opinion of the Court, render repugnant to justice the equal sharing 
between the partners of any communal property, the share of each shall be 
determined in accordance with the contributions of each to the partnership. 
(2) Where the Court is considering departure from section 12 of this Act, it 
shall take into account the following; 
(a) The time that the family home was acquired; and 
(b) The respective legal or beneficial shares of the partners m the 
communal property of the relationship at the commencement date of the 
relationship; and 
(c) Any agreements between the partners as to the respective shares of 
each of them in the family home; and 
(d) The duration of the relationship; and 
(e) The respective contributions, in whatever form, of each partner to the 
relationship; and 
(f) The existence or otherwise of children of the family and the future 
needs of those children; and 
(g) Any other matter that the Court thinks fit. 
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Ba, ed 011 rhe farri111011ial Property Acr 1976, bur a le srrin~ellf re t rha11 , ecrio11 
1-1 of rhar Acr in rhar extraordinary circu111sta11ces are nor required. There H'ill be 
ome relationships where there are mlid reasons for deparring from equal , haring 
in rhe properry of the relation hip. ubsection 2 Ii t mauers for rhe Court ro 
con ider to pro\'ide guidance to the judiciary. 
14. Weight to be given to contributions-There ' hall be no presumpti n 
that a contribution of a monetary nature i of greater value than a contribution 
of a non-monetary nature. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 18(2). It is considered nece ar\' ro rare rhi, 
to counter judicial bias. 
15. Misconduct-In determining the contribution of a de facto partner to the 
relationship, the Court may take into account any mi conduct of a partn r to 
the relationship that ha been gro and palpable and ha ignificantly affected 
the extent or value of the communal property; but hall not other\ i e take 
any misconduct of a spouse into account, whether to dimini h or detract from 
the positive contribution of that partner otherwi e how oever. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 18(3). 
Agreements 
16. Power to make agreements-(1 ) Partners to a de facto relationship, or 
any 2 people contemplating entering into such a relation hip with each other, 
or any two people terminating, or who have terminated a de facto relation hip 
with each other, may, for the purpose of contracting out of the provi ion of 
thi Act or for the purpo e of settling any differences that have arisen 
between them concerning property owned by either or both of them, make 
such agreement with respect to the status, ownership, and division of their 
property (including future property) as they think fit. 
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(2) Without limiting the generality of subsections ( 1) and (2) of this section, 
any such agreement may-
(a) Provide that any property or class of property shall be communal 
property or shall be separate property; or 
(b) Define the share of the communal property or any part thereof that 
each spouse shall be entitled to upon the termination of the relationship 
otherwise than by death; or 
(c) Provide for the calculation of such share and prescribe the method by 
which the communal property or any part thereof may be divided. 
(3) Every agreement entered into under this section shall be in writing igned 
by both parties. 
(4) Each party to an agreement under this section shall have independent legal 
advice before signing the agreement. 
(5) Without limiting subsection 4 of this section, independent legal advice 
shall include: 
(a) The effect of the agreement on the rights of the parties under this 
Act; 
(b) Whether it is advantageous, financially or otherwise, for that party to 
enter into the agreement; 
(c) Whether it is prudent for that party to enter into the agreement; 
(d) Whether the agreement is fair and reasonable in the light of the 
circumstances that were reasonably foreseeable. 
(6) The signature of each party to an agreement under this section shall be 
witnessed by a solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand. The witnessing 
solicitor shall certify that before the party whose signature he or he ha 
witnessed signed the agreement he or she has explained to that party the 
effect and implications of the agreement. 
(7) Where subsections 3 and 6 have not been complied with in respect of an 
agreement under this section the Court may declare that an agreement under 
this section shall have effect in whole or in part or for any particular purpose 
if it is satisfied that the non-compliance has not materially prejudiced the 
interest of any party to the agreement. 
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(8) An agreement under this section shall be void in any case where-
( a) Subsections (4) to (6) of this section have not been complied with; 
or 
(b) The Court is satisfied that it would be unjust to give effect to the 
agreement. 
(9) In deciding whether it would be unjust to give effect to an agreement 
under this section the Court shall have regard to; 
(a) The provisions of the agreement: 
(b) The time that has elapsed since the agreement was entered into: 
( c) Whether the agreement was unfair or unreasonable in the light of all 
the circumstances at the time it was entered into: 
(d) Whether the agreement has become unfair or unreasonable in the 
light of any changes in circumstances since it was entered into (whether 
or not those changes were foreseen by the parties); 
(e) Any other matters that the Court considers relevant. 
(10) Nothing in subsection 8 shall limit or affect any enactment or rule of law 
or of equity whereby any contract is void, voidable, or unenforceable on any 
other ground. 
This provision to contract out of the Act is important in terms of individual autonomy 
and preserves the right to order one's affairs as one wishes. It is based directly on 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 21, and in doing so gives wide powers to the 
Court to uphold or vary the terms of the agreement. Subsection 5 sets out matters 
that the advice must include; cf Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 33( l)(d). 
It is recommended that the state provide assistance with the cost of independent legal 
advice, even though this would probably necessitate an extension to the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976. 
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Court orders 
17. Division of property-The Court may, ubject to the provisions of this 
Act, make-
(1) Such order as it considers just determining the respective hares of each 
partner to the de facto relationship in the communal property or any part 
thereof, or dividing the communal or any part thereof between the partners 
to the relationship. 
(2) In respect of existing rights or title in respect of property, the Court may 
declare the title or rights, if any, that a de facto partner has in respect of the 
property. 
(3) An order under this section is binding on the de facto partners but not on 
any other person. 
CJ Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 40; Property Law Amendment Act 
1987 (Viet), s 278; De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), s 8. 
18. Court orders-In order to give effect to a division of property under 
section 17 of this Act, the Court may, subject to the provi ions of this Act, 
make the following orders: 
(1) Order the transfer of property; 
(2) Order the sale of property and the distribution of the proceeds of sale 
in such proportions as it thinks fit; 
(3) Order that any necessary deed or instrument be executed and that 
documents of title be produced or other things be done to enable an 
order to be carried out effectively or to provide security for the due 
performance of an order; 
( 4) Order payment of a lump sum, whether m one amount or by 
instalments; 
(5) Order that payment of any um ordered to be paid be wholly or 
partly secured in such manner a the Court directs; 
(6) Appoint or remove trustees; 
(7) Make an order or grant an injunction-
- 62 -
(a) For the protection of, or otherwise relating to the property or 
financial resources of either or both of the partners to the 
relationship; or 
(b) To aid enforcement of any other order made in respect of an 
application; 
(8) Impose terms and conditions; 
(9) Make an order by consent; 
( l 0) Make an order granting one of the partners to the relationship the 
right personally to occupy the family home, subject to such terms and 
conditions as the Court thinks fit. 
(11) Make an order settling the communal property of the relationship 
or any part thereof for the benefit of the children of the relationship. 
(12) Make any other order or grant any other injunction (whether or not 
of the same nature as those mentioned in this section) that it considers 
is necessary to do justice between the parties. 
CJ Property Law Amendment Act 1987 (Viet), s 291; Domestic Relationships Act 
(ACT), s 25. Grants a wide range of powers to the Court. 
Proceedings under Act 
19. Jurisdiction-(!) The Family Court and the High Court shall each have 
jurisdiction in respect of proceedings under this Act: 
Provided that a Family Court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any 
application in respect of any communal property where proceedings under this 
Act relating to or affecting that property are pending in the High Court at the 
date at which the application i made. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of this section, if a Family 
Court judge is of the opinion that any such proceedings under this Act, or any 
question in any such proceedings, would be more appropriately dealt with in 
the High Court, he or she may, upon application by any party to the 
proceedings of without any such application, refer the proceedings or the 
question to that Court. 
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(3) The High Court, upon application by any party to proceedings pending 
under this Act in a Family Court, shall order the proceedings to be removed 
into the High Court unless it is satisfied that the proceedings would be more 
appropriately dealt with in a Family Court. Where the proceedings have been 
so removed they shall be continued in the High Court as if they had been 
properly and duly commenced in that Court. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 22. The Family Court is appropriate for 
reasons of cost, ease of access, privacy, informality, ability to operate inquisitorially 
and because the Family Court also deals with custody and access issues. 
Complicated cases may be transferred to the High Court by a Family Court judge 
or on application by the parties if the High Court agrees. 
20. Appeals-(!) Where a Family Court has made or has refused to make an 
order in any proceedings under this Act, or has otherwise finally determined 
or has dismissed any proceedings under this Act, a party to the proceedings 
or any other person prejudicially affected may, within 28 days after the 
making of the order or decision or within such further time as the Court may 
allow in accordance with section 73( 1) of the District Courts Act 194 7, appeal 
to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of Part V of that Act. 
(2) The provisions of the Judicature Act 1908 relating to appeals to the Court 
of Appeal against a decision of the High Court of New Zealand shall apply 
accordingly with respect to any order or decision of the High Court of New 
Zealand under this Act. 
(3) Subject to the rules governing appeals on Her Maje ty in Council against 
a decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand or of the High Court of 
New Zealand, such an appeal may be made in proceedings under this Act to 
Her Majesty in Council. 
(4) The High Court or the Court of Appeal, as the case may be, may, in it 
discretion, rehear the whole or any part of the evidence, or may receive 
further evidence, if it thinks that the interests of justice so require. 
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CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 39. 
21. Interests of children-(!) The Court shall, in proceedings under this Act, 
have regard to the interests of any minor or dependent children of the 
relationship. 
(2) If in the opinion of the Court there are special circumstances which render 
it necessary or expedient that any minor or dependent children of the 
relationship be represented in any proceedings under this Act, the Court may 
appoint a solicitor or counsel to represent such children. Where any solicitor 
or counsel is appointed his or her fees and expenses shall be paid by such 
party or parties to the proceedings as the Court shall order or, if the Court so 
decides, shall be paid out of money appropriated for the purpose by 
Parliament. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 26. Subsection 2 allows for representation of 
children. Without provision of this paid service, the right of children to be heard 
would be ineffective. 
22. Interests of other parties-In the exercise of a power under this Act, the 
Court shall have regard to the intere ts, and shall make any order proper for 
the protection, of a purchaser in good faith or other interested person. 
23. Duty of Court-Subject to section 21 of this Act, so far as is practicable, 
a Court shall make orders that will end the financial relationships between the 
de facto partners and avoid further proceedings between them. 
The clean break principle is promoted but made subject to the on-going parental 
relationship of the parties and the future needs of the children. CJ Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 14; De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), s 19. 
24. Proceedings to held in private-Any proceeding under this Act shall be 
held in private. 
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Of mandatory applicatio11. 
25. Mediation-A Court may refer all or any of the matter, in disput m 
proceeding before it to a mediator. 
CJ Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 8. The details of this prm isio11 would 
need to be explored, especially the appoi11tment of appropriate mediators, issues of 
confidentiality, payment and the binding effect or otherwise of any agreement 
reached. 
26. Evidence-(!) In all proceedings under this Act the Court may receive 
any evidence that it thinks fit, whether it is otherwi e admissible in a Court 
of law or not. 
(2) The Court may appoint the Registrar of the Court, or such other person 
as the Court thinks fit, to make an inquiry into the matter of fact in issue 
between the parties, and to report thereon to the Court. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, ss 36 and 38. An inquisitorial approach is 
adopted to give greater power to the Court to gather and hear all relevant evidence. 
27. Restriction of publication-(! ) No per on shall publish any report of 
proceedings under this Act except with the leave of the Court which heard the 
proceedings. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the publication of any report in any 
publication that-
( a) I of a bona fide or technical nature; and 
(b) Is intended for circulation among members of the legal profession. 
CJ Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 35A. invokes the principle of privacy of the 
parties. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of de facto property rights has been considered in this paper and the need 
for legislative intervention established. Existing legal remedies are inadequate both 
in their scope and in their ability to give proper recognition to direct and indirect 
non-financial contributions to the property of the relationship and to the relationship 
itself. 
A call for legislative reform is a plea for state action. This action is in the interests 
of the state. Legislation would bring regulation into line with moral, social and 
legislative changes. These alterations have resulted in changes in the type of family 
unit that is recognised and this in turn means that de facto property rights can be 
more readily asserted. Increasing numbers of cohabiting couples, a shift in moral 
values, the changing emphasis on the functional family and the rise in importance of 
the place of children in society and within the family also lend support to calls for 
reform. Society would benefit by having de facto property issues resolved in a fairer 
and cheaper way than they are at present. 
Having examined the need for reform, the next logical step was to examine any 
barriers to the enactment of de facto property rights legislation. New Zealand has 
obligations to promote human rights as set out in several United Nations documents 
as well as in domestic legislation such as the Human Right Act 1993 and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The proposed De Facto Property Rights Bill would 
promote these rights without encroaching on other rights, such as the right to marry. 
The human rights movement is indicative of a widening and more inclusive definition 
of family. This has resulted in de facto relationships becoming more likely to be 
supported as viable alternatives to marriage. Perhaps less socially accepted, although 
again supported by human rights law, are same sex marriages. 
The issue of how "marriage-like" a de facto relation hip could and should be has 
received attention and ha al o been the focus of other commentators who have 
discussed whether to treat marriage and de facto relationships as equivalent states. 
A comparison of de facto relationships with marriage is both inevitable and useful, 
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but as the conclusion of this paper is to promote a statute that deals only with de 
facto relationships, and in doing so keep them distinct from marriage for the purpose 
of the resolution of property issues, the real issue is comparative as opposed to 
assessing equivalency. This paper has not sought a definition of de facto relationship 
that would render it the same as marriage, rather it seeks to consider whether the 
similarities that exist between marriage and de facto relationships mean that similar 
property division law should apply. The point of comparison has been to ju tify both 
the need for intervention and for a kind of intervention based on principles similar 
to marriage, for example, on a presumption of equal sharing of communal property. 
The historical development of marriage demonstrates a movement once again to a 
position of increasing similarity between marriage and de facto relationships, and a 
De Facto Property Rights Bill could be viewed as the removal of yet another 
difference between them. 
The private nature a de facto relationships and their fluidity present problems of 
definition. However, these are not insurmountable from the point of view of defining 
a de facto relationship within a legislative scheme. The approach to definition in this 
paper has been to create a definition drawn from New Zealand and Australian 
legislation which allows for an amount of judicial discretion within certain statutory 
guidelines and parameters. There is an element of caution in limiting the definition 
of de facto relationship in a way that aligns it with marriage. It i perceived that a 
statute that extends the notion of marriage would gain acceptance more readily than 
a statute that provided more radical challenges to it. It is for this reason that only 
relationships in the nature of marriage are included within the proposed statutory 
definition. Extension of this concept to same sex marriages is supported by the 
Human Rights Act 1993 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and by the 
remedial focus of the proposed legislative change. It is considered that this point 
alone would create a significant amount of debate within the community and within 
Parliament, and that any further extensions, such as those involving dome tic 
relationships or multi-party relationships would increase the debate to counter-
productive levels. 
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Having worked through and established a need for reform and looked at some of the 
possible barriers to its implementation, the natural progression is to a legislative 
proposal. The proposed scheme is influenced by New Zealand's matrimonial 
property legislation, which contains many commendable features, and by overseas 
legislation, particularly that found in various Australian states. The aim was to bring 
together the best features of a number of systems, in order to best achieve the 
remedial focus. The proposal provides a detailed outline of the possible shape of 
legislative reform. 
State regulation of de facto property rights appears to have the support of the 
community, members of the legislature and members of the judiciary. The time for 
transforming that support into an Act of Parliament has arrived. 
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